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     * The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 06-1226
                    
PAUL GUNSER; SHAWN DOUGHERTY; ALBERT PRICE;
JOSEPH ALLAN; JOSEPH MCGINTY; ANTHONY KOWALSKI
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; PHILADELPHIA POLICE
DEPARTMENT; SYLVESTER JOHNSON, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY; JUDY DUNN; CHARLES FEGGINS; MICHAEL
GELOVICH; MAURICE LANIER
           Paul Gunser, Albert Price,
           Joseph Allan and Anthony Kowolsky,
                                        Appellants
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-03548
District Judge:  The Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe.
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 21, 2007
                    
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES, and TASHIMA,* Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 12, 2007)
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OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellants contest the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Appellees on Appellants’ claims of First Amendment retaliation, violation of due process,
and malicious prosecution.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Appellants are four current and former Philadelphia police officers who
investigated the May 2000 collapse of a nightclub and restaurant into the Delaware River. 
In the course of their investigation, they recovered eight beer kegs from the river and
subsequently redeemed them for cash, allegedly allocating the monies to a police coffee
fund.  Several weeks later, an anonymous letter was sent to the Pennsylvania Attorney
General accusing the officers of improper “diverting of evidence,” and accusing Sergeant
Shawn Dougherty of engaging in non-work-related activities while on duty.  
An internal investigation followed.  Dougherty was criminally prosecuted and
acquitted, but was nevertheless dismissed; the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) filed a
grievance that was ultimately settled.  Meanwhile, Appellants were transferred out of the
Marine Unit for impeding the investigation, and the FOP filed a separate grievance on
their behalf.  After Appellants told internal investigators that they would testify on
Dougherty’s behalf, formal disciplinary proceedings were instituted against them.  They
3ultimately settled their grievance, including the disciplinary proceedings, by agreeing to
waive any legal claims they might have arising out of the subject matter of the grievance. 
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Appellants’ records were expunged; two of the
Appellants were transferred back to the Marine Unit, and two others received small cash
payments.    
Appellants, together with Dougherty and another officer, Joseph McGinty, filed
this § 1983 lawsuit on July 23, 2004 against the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia
Police Department and its Commissioner in his official capacity, and four police officers
whom Appellants accuse of sending the anonymous letter (collectively, “Appellees”). 
The complaint alleged claims for First Amendment retaliation, violation of due process,
and malicious prosecution.  Appellees filed an answer and counterclaim for breach of
contract and tortious interference with contractual relations.  
After limited discovery, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment and two
supplemental motions for summary judgment.  The District Court, by order dated
November 15, 2005, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Appellees as to all
claims brought by Appellants and McGinty, but denied summary judgment as to
Dougherty’s malicious prosecution claim.  By order dated December 15, 2005, the
District Court directed the clerk to terminate Appellees’ supplemental motions for
summary judgment as having been decided by the Court’s November 15, 2005
memorandum and order.  Appellants filed a notice of appeal on January 13, 2006.  The
remaining parties (Dougherty and Appellees) settled their dispute on October 12, 2006,
4and a final order of dismissal was entered the following day.
II.
A.
As a threshold matter, Appellees argue that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal
because Appellants filed their notice of appeal more than 30 days after the District
Court’s November 15, 2005 order.  Appellants respond that their notice of appeal was
timely filed within 30 days of the District Court’s December 15, 2005 final order.  We
disagree with both views, finding, instead, that the final order from which the appeal
should have been taken was the October 12, 2006 order dismissing the remaining claims
between Dougherty and Appellees.  
When an order of a district court disposes of fewer than all claims or claims
against fewer than all parties, an aggrieved party generally may not immediately appeal
unless the district court expressly determines that there is no just cause for delay and
expressly directs entry of final judgment.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Carter v. City of Phila.,
181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1999).  A statement of reasons must accompany the entry of
final judgment under Rule 54(b).  Carter, 181 F.3d at 343.  No Rule 54(b) certification or
statement of reasons accompanied the November 15, 2005 or December 15, 2005 orders,
so we conclude that the October 12, 2006 order of dismissal was the District Court’s final
judgment.  Because Appellants filed their notice of appeal before the entry of final
     1  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and will affirm only if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Davis v.
Mountaire Farms, Inc., 453 F.3d 554, 556 (3d Cir. 2006).
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judgment, their appeal is timely.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).1 
B.
In their prior settlement agreement, Appellants released Appellees from “any
claims [Appellants] had, have, or may have against [Appellees] arising out of the subject
matter of the aforementioned grievance and demand for arbitration.”  (Appellants’ App. at
51.)  Appellants argue that the grievance contested only their improper transfer out of the
Marine Unit.  Thus, they contend, the settlement agreement, in which the FOP agreed to
withdraw its grievance of their improper transfer, did not purport to settle other
employment-related claims that Appellants might have, such as claims for allegedly
retaliatory investigations and disciplinary charges.  
We construe releases according to principles of state contract law, insofar as state
law is consistent with federal objectives.  Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
522 F.2d 885, 892 (3d Cir. 1975).  Under Pennsylvania law, our guiding concern when
construing the scope of a release is to honor the parties’ intent.  Id.; A.G. Cullen Constr.,
Inc. v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 898 A.2d 1145, 1167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).  We do
this by looking at the language of the release and the circumstances surrounding its
execution.  A.G. Cullen, 898 A.2d at 1167.  The language of a larger settlement
6agreement into which the release is incorporated may also provide key insight into the
parties’ intent.  Id. at 1167-68; see also, e.g., Rossi v. Pa. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Review, 676 A.2d 194, 197 (Pa. 1995).
The release here forecloses claims against Appellees “arising out of the subject
matter of the aforementioned grievance and demand for arbitration.”  (Appellants’ App. at
51.)  We must determine, therefore, the scope and “subject matter” of the grievance and
demand for arbitration.  There is no dispute that, at least initially, the grievance
challenged only Appellants’ transfer out of the Marine Unit.  (See id. at 132; see also id.
at 133-34 (dating the disciplinary proceedings after the filing of the grievance).) 
Appellees contend, however, that in the course of the grievance proceedings, Appellants
also argued that the disciplinary proceedings against them were improper.  To verify that
Appellants did, in fact, raise this issue in the grievance proceedings, we need look no
further than the unambiguous language of the settlement agreement.     
The settlement agreement provided that in consideration of the FOP agreeing to
withdraw its grievance, Appellees agreed to rescind the disciplinary charges and expunge
Appellants’ official records.  (Id. at 50.)  Thus, the settlement agreement resolved, not
only the grievance, but also the disciplinary proceedings against Appellants.  It did so,
moreover, pursuant to the parties’ express “desire to resolve this matter without resort to
further litigation.”  (Id. at 49 (emphasis added).)  We think it clear, therefore, that the
parties to the settlement agreement viewed “this matter” as encompassing both the
contested transfer of Appellants out of the Marine Unit, and the disciplinary charges
     2  To the extent that our caselaw requires us to consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the settlement agreement, see W.B. v. Matula,
67 F.3d 484, 497 (3d Cir. 1995), we find that Appellants’ waiver of the type of claims
that they now assert was knowing and voluntary.
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pending against them.  This was the “subject matter” of the grievance and arbitration
proceedings at the time the parties executed their settlement agreement.
We easily conclude, therefore, that the parties intended to foreclose the very type
of claims that Appellants now assert.  That Appellants did not previously raise these
precise claims is irrelevant.  The propriety of the disciplinary action against Appellants
was part of the subject matter of the grievance, and their current claims, which raise but a
new challenge to the propriety of the disciplinary proceedings, clearly arise out of that
subject matter.  The parties’ express intention to resolve that matter “without resort to
further litigation” controls, and we conclude that Appellants have waived their current
claims.2
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the final judgment of the District Court
granting summary judgment to Appellees as to all of Appellants’ claims. 
